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ABSTRACT
Energy and climate policies may have signiﬁcant economy-wide impacts, which are
regularly assessed based on quantitative energy-environment-economy models.
These tend to vary in their conclusions on the scale and direction of the likely
macroeconomic impacts of a low-carbon transition. This paper traces the
characteristic discrepancies in models’ outcomes to their origins in diﬀerent macro-
economic theories, most importantly their treatment of technological innovation
and ﬁnance. We comprehensively analyse the relevant branches of macro-
innovation theory and group them into two classes: ‘Equilibrium’ and ‘Non-
equilibrium’. While both approaches are rigorous and self-consistent, they
frequently yield opposite conclusions for the economic impacts of low-carbon
policies. We show that model outcomes are mainly determined by their
representations of monetary and ﬁnance dimensions, and their interactions with
investment, innovation and technological change. Improving these in all modelling
approaches is crucial for strengthening the evidence base for policy making and
gaining a more consistent picture of the macroeconomic impacts of achieving
emissions reductions objectives. The paper contributes towards the ongoing eﬀort
of enhancing the transparency and understanding of sophisticated model
mechanisms applied to energy and climate policy analysis. It helps tackle the
overall ‘black box’ critique, much-cited in policy circles and elsewhere.
Key policy insights
. Quantitative models commissioned by policy-makers to assess the macroeconomic
impacts of climate policy generate contradictory outcomes and interpretations.
. The source of the diﬀerences in model outcomes originates primarily from
assumptions on the workings of the ﬁnancial sector and the nature of money,
and of how these interact with processes of low-carbon energy innovation and
technological change.
. Representations of innovation and technological change are incomplete in energy-
economy-environment models, leading to limitations in the assessment of the
impacts of climate-related policies.
. All modelling studies should state clearly their underpinning theoretical school and
their treatment of ﬁnance and innovation.
. A strong recommendation is given for modellers of energy-economy systems to
improve their representations of money and ﬁnance.
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1. Introduction
Climate and energy targets could be met via diﬀerent pathways and combinations of supply-side and demand-
side technological and socioeconomic options. Signiﬁcant debate exists on strategies for achieving an eﬃcient
and cost-eﬀective sustainable energy transition (Edenhofer et al., 2010; IPCC, 2014b; Kriegler et al., 2014; Nord-
haus, 2010; Nordhaus, 2015; Rogelj et al., 2015; Rogelj et al., 2018; Stern, 2007). Macro-models are used exten-
sively in this context to inform policy-making, notably through the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) process (IPCC, 2014b), and in national, European and international policy-making.1
Following the recent context of economic instability in many countries across the globe, it is of primary
importance to determine whether climate policies will hinder or boost economic growth, lead to unsustainable
debt levels, generate economic opportunity or impose an economic burden (Mercure, Pollitt, Bassi, Viñuales, &
Edwards, 2016b; Stern, 2007; Stern, 2015).2 Innovation as a driver of economic activity is a recurrent theme in
current discourses on economic development (BIS, 2011; European Commission, 2017; OECD, 2015), as well
as public and private aggregate debt (Mazzucato, 2018; McLeay, Radia, & Thomas, 2014b, 2014a), This particu-
larly relates to low-carbon and energy innovation, which could either fuel future prosperity or become an econ-
omic burden, its scale being suﬃciently large to inﬂuence the macroeconomy.
Energy-economy-environment (E3) models are typically designed to inform policy-makers on technology or
economic scenarios for achieving low-carbon transformations. However, they do not currently address in the
required detail some of the key features of low-carbon innovation, including the necessary investment and
ﬁnance of technology transitions, leaving unanswered questions for actual policy application (Grubb, Hourcade,
& Neuhoﬀ, 2014; Mercure et al., 2016b; Pollitt & Mercure, 2018). As we show here, consensus has never been
reached over how to treat innovation and technological change, and ﬁnancing, in basic economic theory.
Since underlying model assumptions on such theory determine model outcomes and policy recommendations,
results are often opposite for diﬀerent models (see e.g. Cambridge Econometrics, 2013, 2015; Carbon Trust,
2005; Edenhofer et al., 2010). This is an issue that has been debated for many years (Grubb, Carraro, & Schelln-
huber, 2006; Grubb, Edmonds, Ten Brink, & Morrison, 1993; Grubb, Köhler, & Anderson, 2002) While there is an
ongoing debate on how to improve the realism of technological change and agent behaviour by using model
experiments (Holtz et al., 2015; Li & Strachan, 2017; Li, Trutnevyte, & Strachan, 2015; McCollum et al., 2017;
McCollum et al., 2018a; Pettifor, Wilson, McCollum, & Edelenbosch, 2017; Trutnevyte, 2016), none of these exper-
iments challenge representations of investment, money and ﬁnance.
This problem reﬂects partly the underestimation of the role of ﬁnance and money on the real economy (Gutt-
mann, 2016; Minsky, 1986; Monasterolo & Raberto, 2018), including stranded assets (McGlade & Ekins, 2015;
Mercure et al., 2018b) or assets at risk from climate change and climate policy (Bank of England, 2015; Battiston,
Mandel, Monasterolo, Schütze, & Visentin, 2017; Campiglio et al., 2018; Carney, 2015), and partly the diﬃculty in
modelling energy-related innovation, technological change and the eﬀectiveness of policy instruments
(Mercure et al., 2016b). Few of the current E3 models (e.g. as in GEA, 2012; IPCC, 2014b; Kriegler et al., 2014)
have representations of the ﬁnancial sector, its relevance for a large scale decarbonization transition and its
impact on the macroeconomy. This is a major shortcoming because such a transition will require large-scale
investment in non-traditional sectors (Pollitt & Mercure, 2018) and put at risk existing investment and assets
(Bank of England, 2015; Battiston et al., 2017; Carney, 2015; Mercure et al., 2018b). It also requires a much
better understanding of the complex behaviour of agents and their response to policy incentives than what cur-
rently exists in the community (Knobloch & Mercure, 2016). While the need for a more explicit representation of
the ﬁnancial sector in macroeconomic models has been widely discussed after the 2007 global ﬁnancial crisis
(e.g. for Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models as they are used by central banks), such a dis-
cussion in the context of climate policy has yet to take place.
In this paper, we review current modelling methodologies for assessing energy and climate policies. We
provide a critical comparative analysis of various approaches to modelling policy-induced energy innovation
and technological change, in order to better inform policy-makers and users of modelling results. We aim to
answer important climate and energy policy questions: can policy and governance accelerate rates of low-
carbon technology substitution, innovation and energy eﬃciency changes? Will this help or hinder economic
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development? And, do models accurately capture the impacts of investment that result from the use of chosen
policy instruments?
For this purpose, we identify features and factors in theory and models that result in particular modelling
outcomes. This requires looking at their underlying theoretical basis and methodological assumptions: how
do we currently understand innovation? Several reviews on the representation of energy-related innovation
in E3 models have been written (Baccianti & Löschel, 2014; Clarke, Weyant, & Edmonds, 2008; Gillingham,
Newell, & Pizer, 2008; Grubb et al., 2002; Hall & Buckley, 2016; Köhler, Grubb, Popp, & Edenhofer, 2006;
Löschel, 2002; Popp, 2006). However, none of these reviews cover the theoretical underpinnings of the
various existing implementations, especially with regards to ﬁnance. Furthermore, many analyses have been
made on how innovation may be induced by prices or policy (Acemoglu, Aghion, Bursztyn, & Hemous, 2012;
Goulder & Schneider, 1999; Goulder, Hafstead, & Williams, 2016; Nordhaus, 2014; Popp, 2002), going back to
Nordhaus (1973) and Hicks (1932), but again, these do not cover the role of money and ﬁnance in technological
change. We note that the various model families have not converged at all to our knowledge over the years. It is
also correct to say that nearly no attention has been given to representations of money and ﬁnance in models,
particularly in the ﬁeld of energy-economy modelling (Grubb et al., 1993; Grubb et al., 2002; Grubb et al., 2006),
as computational experiments with ﬁnance have been made outside of the ﬁeld (Battiston et al., 2016; Haldane
& Turrell, 2018).
In Section two, we review how innovation and ﬁnance are addressed in recent economic theory and models.
Section three shows how diﬀerent underlying theories imply diﬀerent perspectives on the macro-economic
eﬀects of policies, how this can be considered in policy-making, and under which conditions models could con-
verge. Section four concludes and proposes a research agenda covering key gaps in the future energy-environ-
ment-economy modelling of low-carbon transitions. The Supplementary Material (SM) provides more
information on the models used in this work.
2. Materials and methods: innovation in economic theory and models
2.1. Technology and innovation in economic theory
Economic theory can be roughly grouped into two diﬀerent schools, each with diﬀerent perspectives on inno-
vation and the macroeconomy: equilibrium economics and non-equilibrium economics.
The equilibrium economics school explains ﬁnance, innovation and productivity change based on Post-Wal-
rasian neoclassical economics (Acemoglu, 2002; Aghion, Howitt, Brant-Collett, & García-Peñalosa, 1998; Arrow,
1962; Romer, 1986; Solow, 1986). The central assumption is that prices coordinate the actions of all agents
that adjust so as to equilibrate the markets for production factors (labour, capital/ﬁnance, knowledge, etc).
The decisions of representative agents (usually one per economic activity) ensure that, given technology and
resource constraints and market imperfections (labour unemployment), all remaining factors are always fully
employed in the most eﬃcient way, determining the state of the economy. This underpins most models
used to assess energy-economy issues in the climate change community (e.g. Capros et al., 2014; Clarke
et al., 2014; Kriegler et al., 2014; Kriegler et al., 2015a; Nordhaus, 2017).
In the non-equilibrium economics school, the economy is seen as being in perpetual dynamical change. At its
heart is Schumpeter’s foundational work3 on the role of the entrepreneur and of the enabling ﬁnancial insti-
tutions (Schumpeter, 1934, 1939, 2014), and Keynes’ analysis of investment and macroeconomic dynamics
(Keynes, 1936), which has been extended by the ‘Post-Keynesians’ into a comprehensive theory of macroeco-
nomics (e.g. Lavoie, 2014). Models that focus on money and ﬁnance follow this theoretical underpinning (e.g.
Bovari, Giraud, & Mc Isaac, 2018; Dafermos, Nikolaidi, & Galanis, 2017; Lamperti, Dosi, Napoletano, Roventini,
& Sapio, 2018; Mercure, Pollitt, Edwards, Holden, & Vinuales, 2018a; Monasterolo & Raberto, 2018).
We summarize here how economic development and productivity change is understood to take place for
both schools. A more extensive review of the treatment of innovation throughout the history of economic
thought is given in (Mercure et al., 2016a).
The basic view of the equilibrium school is one of optimal allocation of scarce economic resources given tech-
nology at each point in time, and of optimal capital accumulation over time (Figure 1 left):
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1 Firms produce by fully using all available production factors (full employment of capital)4 to meet the demand
for their products, given the technology options and households’ preferences for consumption.
2 Firms decide on investment that maximizes their net present value, and seek ﬁnancing from the capital
market, which the interest rate clears.
3 Firms’ revenues from selling products are paid out to households, according to their provision of labour and
capital ownership to the production process. Based on an intertemporal utility maximization, households
choose how to allocate this income between consumption (of various goods) and saving.5
4 Savings are used to ﬁnance ﬁrms’ investments. Investment accumulation deﬁnes the capital stock available
for production, which includes: physical production facilities (e.g. new factories, replacement of retired
machinery, etc.), and investments into knowledge stock (e.g. technical progress, R&D).
5 The increased amount of capital, labour (population) and their improved factor productivity (resulting from
R&D expenditure) expand the production frontier, which allows higher volumes of production.
Meanwhile, the non-equilibrium school contends that economic development takes place through entrepre-
neurial activity and the creation of purchasing power by banks (Figure 1 right):
1 Entrepreneurs sense where potential demand is not satisﬁed and see potential applications for their ideas.
They apply to ﬁnancial institutions to ﬁnance their innovative improvements to the existing capital stock.
Banks oﬀer loans and create deposits, based on entrepreneurs’ credit-worthiness and the expected proﬁtabil-
ity of the investment project.
2 Bank-funded investment in new capital involves R&D expenditure in various connected technologies and
sectors, which increases their productivity.
3 Productivity improvements reduce production costs. This can result in a mixture of (1) proﬁts for the entre-
preneurs and (2) price reductions in consumer markets. Both result in higher income for households, higher
demand for the new products, and/or (3) reduced imports, and/or (4) increased exports.
4 Higher income leads to higher eﬀective demand (for all products) and higher saving.
5 Higher demand and proﬁts incentivise ﬁrms to re-invest in R&D and to expand their capital stock.
These two representations are radically diﬀerent in their key principles and lead to contrasting approaches
when implemented quantitatively, with opposite directions in the ﬂow of information:
Figure 1. Contrasting representations of economic growth in the Post-Keynesian/Post-Schumpeterian (non-equilibrium) schools to the neoclas-
sical (equilibrium) school.
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In the equilibrium school, a representative agent maximizes utility by allocating ﬁxed resources between
possible uses, so that the methodology is generally tied to constrained optimization (optimization henceforth;
every point in time is optimal and in a steady state within its context). In this perspective, the economy is
driven by its ability to produce (supply-led).
In the non-equilibrium school, the state of the economy at every time step primarily depends on its states in
previous time steps and expectations of the future and ﬁnancial resources are unconstrained, so that the meth-
odology is generally tied to dynamical systems simulations (simulation henceforth). In that perspective, the
economy is driven by demand (demand-led). These are independent traditions of mathematics research,
often pursued independently from one another.
While the simulation/optimization terminology may be neither exhaustive nor always exact,6 in practice it
classiﬁes eﬀectively the methodology used in most contemporary models, and captures a marked methodologi-
cal division that reinforces theoretical diﬀerences and perceptions for policy-making.7
The theoretical diﬀerence between the schools has at its heart a diﬀerence in the treatment of risk and
uncertainty in investment and ﬁnance (Fontana, 2008; Keynes, 1921).8 Keynes describes risk as quantiﬁable
probabilities of outcomes of an action (e.g. investment), while uncertainty is unquantiﬁable. In Post-Keyne-
sian theory, it is assumed that investment takes place under fundamental uncertainty, which makes it
impossible for agents to reliably estimate the likelihood of return on investment. Keynesian theory
assumes that due to lack of detailed information, it is not possible for agents to devise a strategy that
fully uses reliably all resources, as opposed to neoclassical theory, in which even under uncertainty,
agents would ﬁnd ways through markets to coordinate the use of all resources. For example, in the non-
equilibrium school, under uncertainty over variations of demand, the investor plans for spare production
capacity, so that he/she can respond to sudden demand changes (Fontana, 2008; Lavoie, 2014). This
implies that investment depends on investor and bank conﬁdence in markets, and drives income and
employment (or unemployment) of resources.
Meanwhile, in pure equilibrium theory in its most basic form, income determines investment through the
propensity to save. Since demand can be relied upon and be foreseen (probabilistically), capital is optimally
planned and used. Thus, capital accumulation determines production, and the theory functions the other
way around. Therefore, the diﬀerent direction of economic causality in equilibrium and non-equilibrium
theory is a consequence of their respective treatments of risk and uncertainty.
A diﬀerence in philosophical interpretation also arises: in basic equilibrium theory, agents behave in a way
that leads to maximal utility for all. This therefore identiﬁes a normative or aspirational scenario, and deviations,
ascribed to real-world eﬀects and policy decisions, are discussed as distortions or frictions. Meanwhile, in non-
equilibrium theory, no scenario is deemed more aspirational than any other; each scenario describes the
economy in a diﬀerent trajectory, and scenarios diverge from one another over time.
2.2. Technology and innovation in contemporary low-carbon transition models
2.2.1. Taxonomy of theories and models used for informing climate policy and beyond
We list representations of money, innovation, technology, methodology and the source of economic change in
ten schools and research areas in economics, grouped into equilibrium and non-equilibrium (Table 1). This list is
not exhaustive, but represents the main contemporary currents of economic thought.
We furthermore classify current macroeconomic and macro-sectoral economic models along the categories
of general equilibrium, partial equilibrium, macro-econometric, systems dynamics and agent-based (Table 2).
Within each of these classiﬁcations, sub-categories exist. We provide a taxonomy of approaches according to
the types of assumptions adopted for the structure of technological change, its representation at the micro
and macro levels, and their representation of the entrepreneur at both levels.
We have classiﬁed the main methodologies in terms of their representation of energy-related innovation, and
representation of agents, at the micro and macro levels. Here ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ are used to refer to the level of
aggregation: ‘micro’ means for example distinguishing individual technologies (e.g. solar PV), while macro
means modelling aggregates at the sectoral or economy-wide level (e.g. the electricity or automotive sectors
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Table 1. Schools of economic thought.
School Name
Micro-foundations:
Rationality / Agent Money
Parameter-isation
method Innovation Technology Economic change
Equilibrium/Supply-
led Neoclassical
Solow1 Rational expectations/
Representative Agent
Commodity Optimization Exogenous Capital accumulation
Endogenous
Growth2
Rational Expectations/
Representative Agent
Commodity Optimization Knowledge in production
functions
Capital & knowledge
accumulation
General3
Equilibrium
Rational Expectations/
Representative Agent
Commodity Optimization Knowledge in production
functions, learning curves,
knowledge spillovers10
Capital & knowledge
accumulation
Non-equilibrium/
demand-led
Post-Schumeterian
Evolutionary
Economics4
Behavioural8
Heterogeneous
Asset
(Credit
creation)
Dynamical systems,
Historical
approach9
Knowledge networks, Diﬀusion,
learning
Entrepreneur, Innovation
clustering, creative
destruction
Transitions Theory5 Historical
Technology
Innovation
Systems6
Case studies
Post-Keynesian7
Horizontalists Behavioural8
Heterogeneous
Asset
(Credit
creation)
Time series
Econometrics
Sectoral tech. progress
functions
Cumulative causation of
knowledge accumulationStructuralists
Behavioural8 Numerous agents – Empirical – –
Marxian Classes – Econometrics – –
Representative Models: 1RICE/DICE (Nordhaus, 2013), 2REMIND (PIK, 2016), 3IMACLIM (CIRED, 2018), AIM (NIES, 2012), GEM-E3 (E3MLab, 2018a), 4Evolutionary Economics (Safarzyńska & van den Bergh,
2010), 5Geels (Geels, 2002), 6Technology Innovation Systems (Hekkert, Suurs, Negro, Kuhlmann, & Smits, 2007), 7E3ME-FTT (Mercure et al., 2018a), GINFORS (Lutz, Meyer, & Wolter, 2009), Giraud stock-
Flow (Giraud, Mc Isaac, Bovari, & Zatsepina, 2016), DEFINE (Dafermos et al., 2017), MINSKY (Keen, 1995), 8Prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), Discrete choice theory (Domencich & McFadden,
1975), 9historical approach (Freeman & Louçã, 2001; Geels, 2002), 10Note that although the method is in use (e.g. in GEM-E3), some but not all GE models feature learning curves or knowledge
spillovers.
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Table 2. Types of macro-models and summary of their assumptions regarding energy-related innovation and investment behaviour.
Assumption type Micro innovation Macro innovation Micro agent Macro agent
Supply-led /
Optimization
Optimal growth1 Does not have detailed
disaggregated sectors
Knowledge accumulation in
economy production
function
Normative social planner optimizing utility inter-
temporally
General Equilibrium
Computable General
Equilibrium2
Can be linked to detailed
technology models
Endogenous productivity in
sectoral production
functions
Representative agent with rational expectations
(deterministic) optimizing utility, prices adjust to clear all
markets
Dynamic Stochastic
General
Equilibrium
Can be linked to detailed
technology models
Exogenous technological
change
Heterogeneous stochastic representative agent
Partial equilibrium
Cost-optimisation3
Learning curves, exogenous
diﬀusion rates, vintage
capital
Productivity not deﬁned, can
be linked to a CGE model
Can be heterogeneous,
market segments
The normative social
planner
Demand-led /
Simulation
Macro-econometric4 Can be linked to detailed
technology models
Technology progress
indicators (fn. of
cumulative investment)
Can be linked to detailed
technology models
Investment behaviour
derived
econometrically
Systems Dynamics
Discrete choice5 Vintage capital (ﬂeets),
learning curves
Productivity not deﬁned, but
can be linked to any macro-
model
Multinomial logit regressions,
heterogeneous agents
Can be linked to macro-
model
Diﬀusion6 Selection-diﬀusion
evolutionary model,
learning curves
Can be linked to a path-
dependent economic
model
Decision-making under
bounded rationality, social
inﬂuence
Can be linked to macro-
model
Agent-based Sectoral7 Vintage capital (ﬂeets),
learning curves
Can be linked to a path-
dependent economic
model
Decision-making under
bounded rationality, social
inﬂuence
Can be linked to macro-
model
Model examples: 1RICE/DICE (Nordhaus, 2013), FUND (Anthoﬀ & Tol, 2014), QUEST (DG ECFIN, 2015), 2GEM-E3 (E3MLab, 2018a), IMACLIM (CIRED, 2018), 3MESSAGE (IIASA, 2014), (PNNL, 2017), TIMES
(IEA/ETSAP, 2016), PRIMES (E3MLab, 2018b), 4E3ME (Mercure et al., 2018a), GINFORS (Lutz et al., 2009) Giraud stock-Flow (Giraud et al., 2016), DEFINE (Dafermos et al., 2017), EIRIN (Monasterolo &
Raberto, 2018) 5IMAGE-TIMER (Bouwman et al., 2006) 6FTT (Mercure et al., 2014) 7MATISSE (Köhler et al., 2009).
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as a whole). Innovation indicates representations of cost-reducing or productivity-enhancing activity, while
agents refer to representations of decision-making and behaviour (e.g. investment decisions).
Representations of endogenous innovation and induced/endogenous technological change (ITC/ETC) were
explored extensively a decade ago, and applied to energy and climate policy (see IMCP, Edenhofer, Kemfert,
Lessmann, Grubb, & Koehler, 2006). The result was that, according to the models, the capital costs and hence
investment requirements to roll out technological change become less over time if learning-by-doing and tech-
nological progress are allowed to take place endogenously in those models.
The change towards ITC/ETC has been crucial: in earlier neoclassical models with inter-temporal optimization,
the representative agent was optimizing utility over a trend of productivity predetermined with certainty. This
had the perverse eﬀect that the representative agent could anticipate future gains in eﬃciency and so postpone
investing in low-carbon energy if this was not cost-optimal. The presence of so-called back-stop technologies9
also had the same eﬀect, promising future solutions that would appear with certainty once made economical.
This in general meant that pre-ETC model results were to a great extent determined by exogenous assumptions
(Grubb et al., 2002). With ITC/ETC, results emerged regarding the clustering of diﬀerent possible types of optimal
path-dependent states of the energy system, whether high or low-carbon (Gritsevskyi & Nakićenovic, 2000).
Exogenous productivity has been equally problematic in Post-Keynesian / Post-Schumpeterian simulation
models. For example, if the eﬃciency of new energy-using technology did not endogenously respond to a
change in prices, models would predict continuous slowdowns of energy-based service demand (e.g. transport,
energy intensive goods, and perhaps economic growth) in scenarios of increasing energy prices, something not
observed in reality (Grubb et al., 2014, p. 209; Grubb et al., 2018). In reality, price rises incentivise investment in
higher eﬃciency and faster technological turnover, while price falls do not imply technology regression (though
they may encourage behaviour that uses more energy, see Grubb et al., 2014).10
However, at the time of these modelling innovations, there was no consensus on the meaning of economic
costs, an ongoing issue (see Grubb et al., 2014, ch. 11). Indeed, in some studies, costs are identiﬁed with total
energy system costs, in other cases with additional investment costs, and yet in other cases, with changes in
GDP or changes in (conceptualized) utility or welfare (which is still the case, see e.g. IPCC, 2014b, ch. 6).
Many contemporary models now feature representations of some degree of ETC/ITC in principle, although it
is not always clear to which degree these mechanisms are relied upon in studies, as they are not always
reported, an issue that can lead to ambiguity for interpretation.11 These representations can be radically
diﬀerent, tracing back again to basic economic theory, namely the neoclassical, Post-Keynesian and Post-
Schumpeterian schools of thought.
2.2.2. Innovation and technological change in macro-economic models
Consistent with the underlying philosophical assumptions about ﬂows of causality in economic systems, the two
theoretical paradigms discussed in Section 2.1 embody the following, opposite, directions of causation with
respect to the treatment of innovation and technological change:
a In the equilibrium/supply-led paradigm, the representative household chooses between consuming its
income now or in the future (i.e. to save). The ﬁnancial resources made available by saving in the
present are exhausted in investment, increasing (with certainty) the production capacity and productivity
for supplying consumption in the future, through the accumulation of physical capital and knowledge.
Capital resources in each year are ﬁnite, and are allocated to their most eﬃcient use (that provides the
highest rate of return). Because in deterministic equilibrium models investment outcomes are known
with certainty, only the eﬃcient portfolios are selected (technology risk-returns relationships are exogen-
ously speciﬁed).
b In the non-equilibrium/demand-led paradigm, the entrepreneur decides under fundamental uncertainty
whether to borrow funds for investing in production capital, R&D and technology. When banks agree to
oﬀer loans, money is created in the form of deposits (the ﬁnance for investment), and saving and invest-
ment both increase equally. Since investment is not constrained by households’ savings, this increases
debt and income simultaneously (unless the economy is operating at full employment). Individual invest-
ments may or may not lead to their intended productivity improvements and proﬁt; at the aggregate level,
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however, they all contribute to an increasing body of knowledge. Economic growth can be driven by
increasing debt (although not indeﬁnitely). The clustering of innovation leads to economic cycles.
In computational implementations, the current model zoology is not so clear-cut, and many models are
hybrid (e.g. IMACLIM (CIRED, 2018) and GEM-E3 (E3MLab, 2018a), see the SM for details). In particular, when
equilibrium models feature elements that cannot be changed even when it would be optimal to change
them (e.g. physical capital with long lifetimes, sticky prices), solutions are ‘sub-optimal’ and models deviate
from ‘aspirational’ eﬃcient markets towards descriptions that more closely reﬂect real-world ‘imperfections’. Fur-
thermore, the representative agent can be given limited foresight (often called the ‘myopic mode’, relaxing the
constraints of rational expectations). Finally, if a ﬁnancial sector is introduced, savings can be borrowed from
abroad and repaid in the future (e.g. in GEM-E3-FIT).
A similar division of paradigms also exists in the bottom-up technology modelling literature: an optimization
versus simulation methodological divide, with a large number of partial equilibrium cost-optimization models of
technology being in use and forming the most common model type. Furthermore, the adoption and diﬀusion of
innovations are processes that are not modelled very well in the community: energy models are found to
produce typically pessimistic outcomes in comparison to observed diﬀusion trends (Wilson, Grubler, Bauer,
Krey, & Riahi, 2013). This points to a clear need to improve this representation, which is currently addressed
in ongoing research initiatives (McCollum et al., 2017; McCollum et al., 2018a; Mercure et al., 2016b).
2.3. The role of money and ﬁnance in current macro-models
A transition to a decarbonized energy system requires signiﬁcant amounts of investment in energy R&D, supply
chains, infrastructure and physical capital, which could substantially exceed what might have been invested in
this sector in an otherwise business as usual scenario. Even in contexts favourable for entrepreneurs to invest in
low-carbon technology, they require access to funds in order for the transition to take place (Pollitt & Mercure,
2018). Such investments could, in principle, displace other (arguably more productive) investments, a detrimen-
tal crowding-out eﬀect. A debate also exists as to whether government or other ﬁnance of innovation in the early
stages of the innovation chain crowds-out or crowds-in other private ﬁnance in later stages (Hottenrott & Rexhäu-
ser, 2015; Mazzucato, 2011; Mazzucato & Semieniuk, 2017, 2018; Popp & Newell, 2012).
In the context of this work, we use a general meaning of ‘crowding-out’: when an agent (government, ﬁrms,
individuals) borrow(s) signiﬁcant amounts of funds in order to invest into productive capital, this demand could
(under certain conditions) divert funds that otherwise would have been used elsewhere in the economy, by
bidding upwards the price of ﬁnance (the interest rate), i.e. pricing out competing projects. Crowding-out
can also apply to physical capital or labour, in which cases prices or wages clear the respective markets.
The potential extent of ‘crowding-out’ depends on the amounts of funds available in the economy, and the
degree to which crowding-out is assumed to take place in the model is determinant for model results.
This subject is once more fundamental to economic theory, where we again have the same two paradigms,
(a) equilibrium and (b) non-equilibrium, this time with a focus on money. For policy contexts favourable for
entrepreneurs to invest signiﬁcant amounts of funds into low-carbon ventures (e.g. due to carbon pricing), out-
comes will diﬀer.
In the equilibrium/supply-led paradigm, investment is determined by saving, which is a ﬁxed proportion of
income. Entrepreneurs compete for this restricted ﬁnite amount made available through ﬁnancial markets/insti-
tutions. Demand for money by diﬀerent sectors at the same time is cleared by the rate of interest, i.e. some entre-
preneurs are outbid by the willingness to pay of others, and are thus crowded-out. Money is a commodity in a ﬁnite
quantity chosen by the central bank; if the central bank prints more money, the value of money decreases propor-
tionally (the neutrality of money). Thus equilibrium models need not have any representation of money or
inﬂation, but only of relative prices. In the climate policy context, low-carbon investments promoted by policy
crowd out other investments key to the economy. This leads to underinvestment in other key sectors for
growth, leading to less productive use of capital, a higher cost of capital and hence overall high costs to the
economy.
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In the non-equilibrium/demand-led paradigm, investment is unrestricted and determined only by the will-
ingness of entrepreneurs to invest and the willingness of banks to lend (unless funds are re-invested proﬁts),
determined by the perception by banks of the credit-worthiness of entrepreneurs. Banks are not solely interme-
diaries, but have a balance sheet and strategy. Banks borrow from each other, to diversify risk, and to/from the
central bank, to gain reserves necessary to underwrite their lending activities (they minimise/optimise the risk
and return of their balance sheet, constrained by ﬁnancial regulation). Money, whether in paper form, or in com-
mercial bank accounts, is a form of asset-liability pair, between two entities, the bank (debtor) and the owner (credi-
tor). Thus all forms of money are ﬁnancial instruments that can be created or destroyed by ﬁnancial institutions
(Lavoie, 2014; McLeay, Radia, & Thomas, 2014a; Schumpeter, 2014). Money creation is thus not constrained by
savings, but only limited by the supply of credible lucrative ventures (in the prevailing context). In times of econ-
omic optimism with high returns on investment, banks expand lending, leading to growth and prosperity; in
times of high perceived risk of default, ﬁnancial institutions restrict lending, leading to economic recession.
Thus GDP can increase in periods of optimism, high borrowing and investment, while it can slump in periods
of pessimism, credit rationing and low conﬁdence.
In line with those perspectives, equilibrium models take the premise that banks only play the role of inter-
mediary between creditors and lenders, and that their role as money creators is neglected. Current non-equili-
brium models, when they lack explicit representations of the ﬁnancial sector, assume the allocation of ﬁnance
‘on demand’ by banks exogenously (i.e. how much money is created) according to how much investment is
required. Notwithstanding the overwhelming role that money and ﬁnance play in driving low-carbon tran-
sitions, the modelling literature that provides a satisfactory representation of such monetary elements is extre-
mely scarce.
3. Results: implications of model choice for climate-related policy-making and macro-
economic eﬀects
3.1. Model outcomes and policy implications by model type
We present our key result and message in Figure 2, based on work using state-of-the-art models from both sides
of the theoretical spectrum. In the case of equilibrium models (red curves), with crowding-out of investment, an
investment-intensive energy transition displaces resources that would have been used more productively
Figure 2. Illustration of GDP changes, relative to a baseline, of a policy-driven sustainability transition for the two groups of modelling schools of
thought, equilibrium and non-equilibrium, in the current state-of-the-art. In this hypothetical example, a sustainability transition is ﬁnanced (self-
ﬁnanced or via borrowing) from time zero until the vertical dashed line, after which low-carbon ﬁnance stops (ﬁgure co-designed by the authors).
It is to be noted that for equilibrium models, recovery post-transition is strongly related to innovation processes such as productivity change,
which mitigate the negative eﬀects. However, even without representations of learning-by-doing and innovation, equilibrium models may
still display a recovery post-transition due to processes such as reductions in fossil-fuel imports. Meanwhile, without representations of debt
burdens, non-equilibrium models would not likely display a convergence post-transition.
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elsewhere in the economy, leading to a sub-optimal equilibrium at lower GDP in the short run.12 As the tran-
sition completes itself and high carbon equipment becomes replaced by low-carbon technology, this displace-
ment ceases and investment returns to normal (undistorted) purposes. In the long-run, with learning-by-doing,
productivity increases, while lower operational expenses (e.g. fuel costs) may be incurred, and GDP recovers, or
may even be improved above the baseline due to improved productivity and trade balance.
We note that a reverse ‘crowding-out’ eﬀect can also arise in equilibrium in cases where policy forces the
shutdown of an economic sector (e.g. oil and gas during decarbonization). In the equilibrium case, this frees-
up capital, which, with optimal allocation, increases the capital available for investment in other sectors,
thereby compensating for the output loss. Thus, the eﬀect goes both ways.
In the case of non-equilibrium models without crowding-out (green curves), an investment-intensive energy
transition programme is predicted to create additional employment and to boost GDP in the short to medium
run, due to a boost in employment stemming from higher investment (which is not oﬀset by the impact of
higher interest rates since ﬁnancing is assumed to be abundant). It is followed by a possible reduction in
macro-economic gains or even decline in the long run as debts are paid back, depending on debt servicing con-
ditions. This is due to money being created by banks for investment in the early phase, which funds construction
and results in activity across the economy, but also increases the debt burden, which remains in the longer term.
For similar reasons as in equilibrium models, long-lasting productivity increases typically remain in the long run,
following cumulative investments in better technology and equipment. These can oﬀset the burden of debt
repayment.
The ‘reverse crowding-out’ eﬀect observed in equilibrium models also does not occur in non-equilibrium
models. In the latter, losses of market share in particular sectors means that related capital and investment
opportunities are truly lost and not replaced, leading to job and income losses despite the aggregate possible
positive impact of investment-led growth in other sectors. This means that rapid structural change instead leads
to stranded capital, for example stranded fossil fuel assets (Mercure et al., 2018b), which do not arise in equili-
brium models.
This explains why models of diﬀerent classes exhibit essentially opposite outcomes for the macroeconomics
of an energy sustainability transition (i.e. GDP and employment). Uncertainty also behaves diﬀerently: in equili-
brium, due to the use of optimization, uncertainty of solutions is linearly related to the uncertainty in parameters,
as it primarily represents the gradient of the optimization function in the vicinity of the optimal point. In con-
trast, non-equilibriummodels are strongly path-dependent. This means that uncertainty on parameters accumu-
lates over simulation time, as path-dependence generates alternate scenarios that diverge from each other,
diﬀering minimally in the short run but becoming signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in the long run. As such, model out-
comes in the far future are more uncertain than those in the near future.13 This property is standard for
complex systems, and arises for example strongly in climate models.
3.2. Is a convergence of models possible?
To move beyond conceptual arguments about diﬀerent economic paradigms and the models that result, the
authors have worked together in enhancing two models based on these diﬀerent fundamental perspectives
– equilibrium (GEM-E3)14 and non-equilibrium (E3ME,15 see the SM for details on both models) – and
focused on how to represent the crucial processes of innovation and ﬁnance applied to climate change mitiga-
tion. The collaboration was facilitated by the fact that both models already had an advanced treatment of
induced innovation, and have been given similar parameterization inputs. We focus here on the representation
of ﬁnance, which we argue is the more fundamental reason for persistent diﬀerences in the magnitude and
direction of model results.
These two models make explicit the mark-up faced by borrowers over a ‘benchmark’ interest rate, where the
mark-up is intended to capture the risks that are speciﬁc to the project / industry sector / country. One such risk is
the capacity of borrowers to service additional debt, and the models construct estimates of the existing debt
carried by each industry (or other institutional sector) based on the history of previous investment and assump-
tions for how that investment was ﬁnanced. The models diﬀer in their determination of the benchmark interest
rate, reﬂecting their respective origins in the equilibrium (GEM-E3-FIT) and non-equilibrium (E3ME-FTT) traditions.
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In both models, the developments allow ﬁnancial constraints to be explored explicitly in scenarios. For
example, a scenario of rapid decarbonization in power generation would be associated with a higher rate of
investment and a higher level of debt carried by the ﬁrms undertaking the investment. This will have the
eﬀect of making the power generation sector a riskier prospect for lenders, reﬂected in a higher cost of capital
and a higher price ultimately passed through to consumers. This can be mitigated by policy, for example
through some form of public underwriting of the higher risk (transferring the risk, and the cost to taxpayers).
In summary, in equilibrium models, the factor limiting the total amount of borrowing is the interest rate,
which clears the market. In non-equilibrium theory, credit-worthiness is what ultimately determines the conﬁ-
dence of banks to invest.
Based on a comparison of preliminary results from the models E3ME-FTT and GEM-E3-FIT, incorporating the
developments described above, the two models appear to converge in their outcomes. As discussions and
debates intensify regarding investment levels required in the context of the low-carbon transition (IPCC,
2018a; McCollum et al., 2018b), it is possible that improving the representations of money and ﬁnance in
both model types could bring much needed coherence and clarity in the macroeconomic messages conveyed
to energy and climate policy makers.
3.3. Clarifying the purpose of models: normative or positive?
The use or not of an optimizing representative agent or social planner construct, as a model representation of
human populations, raises questions as to the nature, purpose and methodology of models deployed in climate
policy making, which appear to be confused: are they normative (identifying best conﬁgurations or strategies in
order to make recommendations, i.e. what agents ought to do) or positive (describing observed reality, i.e. what
agents are observed to do)? By deﬁnition, an economic allocation identiﬁed by systems optimization is the best
possible allocation (under certain chosen criteria and constraints, and according to existing knowledge). The
ﬁnding that an optimal resource allocation is not achieved due to frictions and market failures, ultimately
reﬂects a normative philosophy of science. Meanwhile, allocations that are identiﬁed and described because
they are considered likely to arise, whether good or bad, reﬂect a descriptive scientiﬁc approach. The science
philosophy question debated here concerns what the research question is, whether agents are understood
to behave in such a way that optimal outcomes are realized in scenarios, and whether those scenarios are in
themselves recommendations or descriptions of reality. Unfortunately, there exists a deep lack of clarity in
the position of modellers on that question in the ﬁeld.
Scenarios calculated using normative optimization models are by deﬁnition ‘possible/plausible’, but they are
not necessarily ‘likely’. Speciﬁcally, it is not possible to determine the likelihood of optimal scenarios occurring in
reality, simply because, even if agents were inclined to contribute to an optimal economic allocation, they would
have no way of ﬁnding out, individually, which strategies would make the correct contribution (Kirman, 1992).
The degree of control and coordination necessary exceeds the capacity of law-makers. Naturally, what is ana-
lysed in optimization scenarios are the diﬀerences from the optimum, not the optimum itself, while in descrip-
tive models, it is diﬀerences from current trajectory that are analysed. Thus, when dealing with optimal
scenarios, the diﬀerence between the ‘baseline’ (no intervention) trajectory and an optimal situation (albeit
with market failures) is sometimes blurred. If not treated carefully, the interpretation of optimization results
could pre-determine the result, in that any market distortion of the baseline scenario would automatically
lead, by construction, to a detrimental performance outcome, even though it corrects market failures (for
instance, its impact on GDP).
Furthermore, a danger exists in interpreting the results of optimization models – inherently normative – in a
descriptive philosophy. For example, cost-optimization and pure representative agent equilibrium models oﬀer
the attractive but potentially misleading suggestion that pricing policies are the best way to correct market failures
such as climate change, since agents, when assumed to behave optimally, always ﬁnd the best possible use of
resources according to prices. Indeed, many such models equate ‘marginal/social cost of carbon’ (what the
models produce from a constraint or externality) with ‘carbon price’ (the assumed policy instrument).
However, policy practice has shown that pricing is usually not the only policy lever to be known to work:
while pricing policies do oﬀer incentives to correct market failures, their likelihood of achieving actual normative
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objectives is not as clear as basic equilibrium theory would suggest.16 Finding out whether carbon pricing is
likely to reach its stated objective requires studying how agents take decisions, including how they take
account of such incentives (Knobloch & Mercure, 2016). The distinction between normative and descriptive
approaches to science is not frequently identiﬁed, but it is crucial if one is to understand the meaning of
model results. Ultimately, the danger lies in the interpretation of model results in terms of causality between
intervention and outcome.
The normative/descriptive paradigms are reﬂected in model behaviour. In optimization-based models, allo-
cations at each point in time modelled are in equilibrium steady states, and thus only change when exogenous
variables change, as for example, population, regulations, trade agreements, the price of carbon, technology
costs or taxation. The converse is that conﬁgurations do not change unless an external parameter changes
(e.g. the price of an internalized externality). This has the result that, for climate change mitigation, additional
emissions abatement only takes place when the (shadow) price of carbon increases.17 Low-carbon technology
diﬀusion stops if the (real) price of carbon or other incentives becomes constant.18 In the scenario database
of the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report (AR5), this leads some models to report very high carbon prices, up to
$10,000/tCO2 or more (IPCC, 2014a, 2018b), that are required to abate the last remaining sources of emissions
in the marginal abatement cost curve. However, in a largely decarbonized world, as carbon markets decline in
relevance, and older socio-technical and industrial systems based on fossil fuels are abandoned and replaced by
newer innovative low-carbon systems, it is not clear how, in reality, the carbon price would behave (Vogt-Schilb,
Meunier, & Hallegatte, 2018).
In a non-equilibrium perspective, model states typically evolve without end even if the policy context
does not change, in part pre-conditioned by their history, momentum and inertia. Thus, technological
change does not solely take place when relative prices change, but instead, happens continuously, since
the methodology does not involve searching for a steady state. In this paradigm, taxes create incentives
to re-orient an ever-changing system towards a new course.19 Indeed, the system may be permanently
altered and the policies which drove the transition to a new path may then become either embedded,
or redundant (or possibly both). Unchanging but signiﬁcant policies are not in this case equivalent to
zero incentive.
This diﬀerence in model behaviour matches a divide within the policy sphere as well. The world of climate
policy is divided along two lines of thought. On the one hand, in the equilibrium paradigm, policy-makers see
carbon pricing as a tool for re-allocating scarce funds to ﬁx a market failure, climate change, focusing on the
marginal abatement cost and social cost of carbon. As a result, it is generally argued that linking or merging
carbon markets increases market eﬃciency.
In the non-equilibrium perspective, energy and climate policy-makers see the carbon price as a signal instru-
ment to incentivise faster economy-wide innovation and low-carbon technological change. The experienced
and expected future price of carbon must be suﬃciently high to communicate the current and future value
of the low-carbon investment to ﬁrms (including R&D), but it is not the only policy available. Regulation can
play an important role, allowing a lower carbon tax, using for instance technology or sectoral policies, including
both ‘push’, and ‘pull’ policies such as the combination of R&D, feed-in tariﬀs and regulatory changes which have
driven the revolution in renewable energy technologies. It is then argued that diﬀerent national innovation
systems, facing diﬀerent contexts, are likely to require diﬀerent magnitudes of incentives (e.g. what creates
an incentive for R&D, innovation and investment in China is not the same as in Germany), and thus carbon
markets should not necessarily be linked internationally to accelerate decarbonization.
4. Discussion and policy implications
Innovation is one of the determining factors in the long run costs of climate change mitigation, a ﬁnding that
may also be relevant for other major structural economic transformation processes. Climate policies that stimu-
late innovation have a plausible prospect of yielding economic beneﬁts, but are also as likely to generate econ-
omic challenges. In fact, climate policies may well be found to generate both at the same time (for instance, see
Mercure et al., 2018b), depending on sectors and regions, the net eﬀect depending on contextual policy design
and mode of implementation.
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Climate and energy policy assessment often involves the use of large complex multi-sectoral computational
economic, energy technology and environmental models, to carry out quantitative analysis. However, inno-
vation, and the ﬁnancing requirements of capital-intensive systems transformations, remains generally not
well represented in models deployed for informing climate and low-carbon energy innovation policy planning.
Furthermore, long-run models that do not explicitly include endogenous innovation have a higher chance of
yielding potentially erroneous results which could become quickly outdated (notably technology costs).
The outcomes of these models are tied to their assumptions and theoretical underpinnings. In order to over-
come the much-referenced ‘black-box’ critique, it is therefore crucial to lay out these assumptions and theoreti-
cal details in a way that makes understanding the results as easy as possible. Since estimates of economic
impacts of policies tend to have an important impact on the political economy of climate policy, greater atten-
tion to the theories, empirics and modelling of ﬁnance is required, in both equilibrium and non-equilibrium
types of models. This paper contributes towards this eﬀort of improving the transparency of sophisticated
model mechanisms and the drivers of their outcomes, when applied in assessing climate and energy policy
impacts.
Depending on the model choice, model results imply that the structural characteristic of the climate change
mitigation problem may or may not be one of burden-sharing to deliver a global public good. Instead, they
could rather point towards the challenge of crafting smart domestic policies combined with international mech-
anisms for accelerating low-carbon technology and policy diﬀusion, and for reducing the cost of capital by
cementing policy commitments in international agreements. Ultimately, with further development, models
may over time depart from the standard framing of climate policy as a prisoner’s dilemma, replacing it by
another type of game with rules based on the consequences of ﬁnancing low-carbon innovation and structural
change.
The observed diﬀerences between the models in their treatment of innovation, money and ﬁnance reﬂect
the lack of consensus among economists and social scientists. While both approaches are theoretically rigorous
and self-consistent, it is important for policy-makers to have some insight into this state of conﬂicting knowl-
edge. It needs to be recognized by both the policy and modelling communities that this schism exists, that rep-
resentations are incomplete, and therefore that further research is critically needed in order to further our ability
to eﬀectively inform climate policy-making. Otherwise, model types can be chosen solely according to whether
their results support or not particular political platforms. In this context, it is reasonable to make the recommen-
dation that, in the interests of transparency for policy-makers and researchers, all modelling studies should state
clearly their underpinning theoretical school and their treatment of ﬁnance and innovation, whether they use
learning-curves, or represent ﬁnance explicitly, something not usually currently done.
Finally, and most importantly, it emerges from our study that developing representations of the monetary
and ﬁnancial sectors is crucial in models used for studying the economic impacts of energy system transform-
ations and emissions reductions. Model diﬀerences completely hinge on whether crowding-out of ﬁnancial
resources takes place or not, which thus needs empirical veriﬁcation. In addition to this, improving represen-
tations of behavioural features in agent decision-making (e.g. technology adoption, bank lending) can
improve the accuracy of models to assess the eﬀectiveness of proposed policies. It is thus imperative that in
existing science-policy interfaces, in which policy-makers routinely commission modelling studies, strong incen-
tives are given to modellers to improve their representations of money and ﬁnance. We argue that this is critical
in order to clarify model outcomes with respect to policy proposals, and attempt to reduce model uncertainty,
the robustness of results, and spur a conciliatory methodological dialogue.
Our explanation of the theoretical and methodological origins of model diﬀerences can help policy-makers
and policy-analysts understand what broad mechanisms the models have and have not taken into account
when interpreting the results of empirical policy analyses. Our analysis may also help shape the future direction
of research and development in theory and models that are used for the analysis of energy and climate policies.
Our analysis could in fact be generalized to the macroeconomic impacts of any type of technological transition
(notably, the on-going transition towards automation and artiﬁcial intelligence). We trust that the knowledge
reviewed here can help not only build a new research agenda, but also, shape the direction of enquiry in
climate policy assessment.
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Notes
1. See, for instance, the several macro-modelling studies commissioned by the Directorate-General for Climate Action or the
Directorate-General for Energy at the European Commission that have fed into the impact assessments underpinning their
2020, 2030 and 2050 EU climate and energy strategies. E.g. see http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/strategies/2020/studies_
en.htm and http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/strategies/2030/documentation_en.htm
2. See Rogelj, McCollum, Reisinger, Meinshausen, & Riahi, (2013); Clarke et al., (2014); Kriegler et al., (2015a); Kriegler et al., (2015b);
McCollum et al., (2018b) for recent engineering estimates of mitigation costs/investment.
3. Schumpeter’s telling representation of innovation has resurfaced in various forms throughout modern economics, for example
in Endogenous Growth Theory (Aghion et al., 1998), Evolutionary Economics (Freeman & Louçã, 2001), Sustainability Tran-
sitions Theory (Geels, 2002), Energy Technology Innovation Systems (Hekkert et al., 2007; Grubler & Wilson, 2013), directed
clean innovation (Acemoglu, 2002; Acemoglu et al., 2012), and ‘planetary economics’ (Grubb et al., 2014).
4. This reﬂects a standard assumption in textbook models. Contemporary equilibrium theory can allow for partial employment,
market imperfections, oligopolisitic competition (Dixon & Jorgenson, 2013).
5. We note the distinction between saving (the action of not spending a fraction of income) and savings (a certain amount of
accumulated wealth). Here we use the verb saving, which implies a yearly ﬂow of income not spent on consumption.
6. For instance, Goodwin’s (1982) model could be classiﬁed as Marxian although it uses some optimal conditions to yield a
closed-form.
7. We avoid the orthodox/heterodox terminology as it is applied to too many issues in economics (values, methods, traditions
and ideology) and is thus insuﬃciently precise for our purposes, and it is only used by a small subset of practitioners. We use
the equilibrium/non-equilibrium, optimisation/simulation and the demand-led/supply-led terminologies to refer to, respect-
ively, the theoretical, methodological and ﬂow of information aspects.
8. Note that DSGE models do attempt to integrate uncertainty to macroeconomic modelling (Christiano, Eichenbaum, & Tra-
bandt, 2018). However, the uncertainty addressed is that which concerns the modeller’s knowledge, not the modelled
agent’s knowledge and expectations, since the rational expectations assumption prevents systematic errors in agent predic-
tions, making the predictions of agents the same as the model’s itself, on average. DSGE models possess the constraints dis-
cussed in this paper in the ‘equilibrium’ sections (see also Pesaran & Smith, 1995).
9. A backstop technology is a hypothetical future technology that, assuming the consumer is willing to pay a high enough price,
could provide inﬁnite amounts of clean energy (e.g. solar photovoltaic or nuclear fusion).
10. Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1993) found, using a CGE model, that the oil price shocks of the 70’ suppressed total factor pro-
ductivity growth temporarily. This result, however, is fully dependent on the assumption of crowding-out discussed below,
as the dynamics involve changes in savings, originating from changes in consumption, that are forced by model construction
to generate equal changes in investment. Without crowding-out, lower (higher) consumption would not be directly linked to
higher (lower) investment.
11. ETC/ITC generates diﬃculties when introduced in optimisation algorithms, and therefore, it is known that such features,
although available, are sometimes (or potentially often) switched oﬀ in order for modellers to improve model stability and/
or reduce computational time (as inferred from our private communications with modellers). Thus, while nearly all model
descriptions and papers claim or have claimed representations of learning curves, it is currently not possible to know when
they are used and when not.
12. Unless, for instance, if the baseline initially included distortions that were then removed in a mitigation scenario.
13. Lower apparent uncertainty bounds in equilibrium models should not be understood as better treatment of real-world uncer-
tainty, but rather, as the uncertainty that can be represented in optimisation algorithms, which are not strongly path-depen-
dent. I.e. increasing uncertainty bounds stem from path-dependence. Path-dependence is typically generated by processes
with increasing returns such as learning-by-doing, diﬀusion dynamics etc (Arthur, Ermoliev, & Kaniovski, 1987; Arthur, 1989;
Gritsevskyi & Nakićenovic, 2000).
14. GEM-E3-FIT: General Equilibrium Model for Energy Economy & Environment with Financial and Technical progress modules.
15. E3ME-FTT: Energy-Economy-Environment Macro-Econometric model with Future Technology Transformations.
16. Notably, most optimisation models assume and require the application of a carbon price to all sources of carbon emissions,
including those in which other policy instruments are currently used and for which no plans currently exist in most countries to
use emissions trading or carbon taxes (e.g. personal mobility, household heating, agriculture). The assumed eﬀectiveness of a
carbon price to reduce emissions in consumer-based sectors is at best conjectural, and not informed by extensive behavioural
research.
17. With the exception of policy instruments involving setting standards which optimisation models reﬂect by reducing the menu
of technological choices, eliminating those polluting technologies that do not meet the standards imposed. In this case emis-
sion reductions can still occur as a response to setting standards without changes in the carbon price.
18. In models without non-convexities, technology composition is a unique function of the carbon price.
19. Diﬀusion is not a simple function of the carbon price or other incentives: increasing the carbon price does not always incenti-
vise the same number of agents deciding to purchase a particular durable good; it depends on history. But also, due to inertia
in diﬀusion, an unchanging (real) carbon price/tax signal can sustain low-carbon technology diﬀusion.
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